

S E C R E T

DD/S&T 609-72

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: Your 18 February Memorandum on
the IG Survey of IRS

1. I welcome your invitation to add my comments to your notes on the IG Report of Survey of the Information Requirements Staff. Let me, first, set the perspective for my remarks by recalling that the stated mission of the Clandestine Service is, in the words of NSCID-5, "espionage and clandestine counterintelligence abroad to meet the intelligence needs of all departments and agencies concerned" -- not, I would point out, just the needs of the production offices of CIA. From that perspective, the Clandestine Service, and particularly the FI Staff, has a close and fruitful relationship with IRS and particularly with its Human Resources Group in regard to requirements of and subsequent assessments by the production offices of CIA.

2. IRS provides requirements from DDI and DDS&T to the Clandestine Service. We deal directly with other agencies and departments on both IPC and ad hoc requirements. We receive and accept or reject requirements from IRS for DDI/DDS&T just as we do from INR for State and from DIA for Defense. For its requirements registry, we do, however, send IRS information copies of requirements we accept from other agencies. In addition, IRS lends valuable assistance to FI Staff in obtaining assessments from DDI/DDS&T analysts. We independently procure similar assessments from State, Defense, or other consumers.

3. Since it is concerned with DDI requirements for and evaluation of human source collection, the Human Resources Group (HRG) of IRS is the principal point of contact for the FI Staff of DDP. Under [redacted] HRG has been most helpful especially in our attempt to obtain meaningful CIA assessments of CS Production. As 25X1A
25X1A IPC member for CIA, [redacted] has been helpful in

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25X1A [] formulating requirements. He and his assistant, []
25X1A [] also played an indispensable part in helping launch
a new mechanism for random sampling of CS reports.

25X1A

25X1A 4. The Programs Guidance Group (PGG) of IRS under [] seeks all-source evaluations and is undoubtedly attractive to management and budget officers who seek cost-effective comparisons between systems. Although PPG reports usually reflect favorable DDI and DDS&T comments on CS reporting in comparison with other human source collection, there may be more difficulty in drawing conclusions about resource allocation between technical and human source collection. In any case, conclusions on CS reporting should not be based merely on CIA inputs to assessments, and PPG/IRS, being a DDI office, cannot but put emphasis on satisfaction of DDI production responsibilities and not necessarily on White House, State or Defense needs. Other agencies also use CS reports, not only in publications or indexed intelligence production, but as contributions to policy consideration, in briefings, in tactical field situations, even in R&D. We should keep in mind this common-concern role of the CS in evaluating CS foreign collection operations not just by a CIA but by a community yardstick.

5. In fine, I think we have a good and appropriate relation with HRG/IRS which can further your aim of improving the intelligence contribution of the CS in meeting the challenges that lie ahead in what concerns the production responsibilities of DDI and DDS&T offices.

6. As to your suggestion that PGG/IRS help in determining the value to customers of the finished intelligence of production offices, I can only record that the Clandestine Service has found direct contact with outside consumer analysts of considerable value in helping adjust focus. I have, as you know, an abiding interest in continuing review of CS operations, both of their professional conduct and evaluation of their production. In order to minimize the stigma of self-criticism, we look outward as much as possible for evaluations by others and we have established our own staff-level review mechanisms so that evaluations are performed by

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elements not in the operational line of command. Given the nature of clandestine operations, we cannot go to completely external review and assessment but, over the years, we have reached what I believe is a judicious balance, with even increased emphasis in the past year on external assessment of our product, CS Intelligence Information Reports. Our experience has been that continuing contact with customers (and a feed-back of their comments into our evaluation procedures) contributes to proper targeting and to the elimination of marginal efforts. I am inclined to believe that your suggestion of a similar sampling of customers of finished production might be equally rewarding to DDI and DDS&T.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

cc: DDI
DDS&T
IG

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Deputy Director for Plans

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment, show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column for each comment.)

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Deputy Director for Science & Technology

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